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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to benchmark DoD, large
contract, supplier monitoring initiatives, specifically within
the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) , against "best
practice" private industry procedures. A methodology for
identification and selection of "best practice" firms was
developed and acquisition procedures within Ford Motor
Company, Motorola, Hewlett Packard, and Intel were reviewed.
Commonalities between acquisition initiatives within these
companies were identified as follows: early supplier
involvement, centralized procurement, supplier monitoring and
recognition, reduced number of suppliers, global sourcing,
and long term contractor relationships. These initiatives
were then compared to DCMC approaches and conclusions drawn
regarding differences and recommendations made to improve DCMC
procedures. Recommendations included; reducing DoD' s supplier
base through monitoring and reward, increasing use of long
term supplier relationships, allowing global sourcing of
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Global competition and customer demand have made quality
one of the single most important criteria for doing business
today. To provide improved quality, major corporations must
rely heavily on the quality of their suppliers in today's
highly specialized marketplace. Truly, the quality demanded
of suppliers dictates the quality of the end product.
Accordingly, the techniques and criteria used to monitor
suppliers in the 70 's have changed dramatically in the 80 's
and 90' s. Best value (quality) vice lowest cost has become
the criterion of choice for supplier selection.
Why focus on quality? The following examples within
private industry, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) , and Department of Defense (DoD)
illustrate the importance of quality and reliance on
specialized suppliers.
1. Quality in Private Industry
The Christmas bonus for 74,000 GM workers in 1991 was
a pink slip, terminating employment, stapled to their time
cards. (U.S. Congress, Jan 1992, p. 19). This was not the
first nor last awakening in America's automobile industry to
the importance of a quality product.
Ironically, the initial reaction of the Big Three
automobile makers was one of denial and a request for
protectionist policy. Looking beyond the common arguments of
unfair Japanese pricing and lower costs of labor and capital,
Figure (1-1) shows the real reason domestic automobile
manufacturers have been unable to compete, a lack of quality.
This graph is a duplicate of one presented to
Congress, by the Big Three automobile manufacturers, in 1992,
during a congressional hearing on urgent fiscal matters. One
of the goals which the Big Three hoped to gain from this
hearing was an import cap on Japanese automobiles. (U.S.
Congress, Jan 1992, p. 124) An import cap never materialized,
and primarily due to their superior quality Japan continues to
be the Big Three's number one competitor.
This graph explains why Japanese automobile market
share in the U.S. has grown to over 2 0% of the market.
(Miller, p. A5) It also shows that U.S. manufacturers have
learned the importance of quality and are making improvements.
Americans both at the corporate and blue collar level realize
that maintaining market share or entering new markets can only
be achieved through a quality product.
Ford Motor Company is a prime example of this renewed
emphasis. Realizing the importance of suppliers in improving
the quality of their end product, Ford, with assistance from
Dr. Deming, established a Ql award for suppliers in 1981 and
founded the American Supplier Institute a year later.
Suppliers who do not reach Ql status in a given period of time
are dropped from Ford's supplier list. Companies which
achieve the Ql rating not only receive increased business from
Ford, but are highly praised in the form of referrals and free
advertising, (e.g. a full page ad in The Wall Street Journal)
(Raia, 1990, pp. 41-43)
QUALITY
THINGS GONE WRONG






Figure 1-1 Automobile Quality (Big Three vs. Japan)
The automobile industry is not alone in its
realization of the reliance on suppliers and need for quality.
National Cash Register (NCR) is another prime example of this
reality. Founded in 1884, their policies centered on self-
sufficiency through the early 1970' s. Their early mechanical
calculators were completely manufactured in- house; they had
their own foundry and even made their own screws. With the
advent of the computer chip, NCR was forced to change their
policy or get out of the business. Today outside suppliers
provide 75% of the parts which go into a much expanded range
of end products. (Raia, 19 89, pp. 52-53) To evaluate the
quality of suppliers, NCR has a five level rating system which
goes from a low (S-5) to a high (S-l) . Not only is an (S-l)
supplier a preferred supplier for follow- on contracts, but its
products are taken directly from the receiving dock to the
manufacturing line without costly in-house inspection. (Raia,
1989, p. 65)
Interestingly, NCR merged with AT&T in 1991 to jointly
pursue advances in telecommunications. (Whiting, pp. 34-40)
2. Quality in NASA and DoD
The fundamental principle of reliance on private
industry for major systems used by NASA and DoD, make both
organizations dependent on suppliers for quality products.
Two examples which illustrate this dependency are given below.
a. NASA
On the 24th of August 1993, less than a week after
NASA lost contact with its billion dollar Mars probe, the CBS
evening news asked the question: "Who is monitoring the
quality of NASA's subcontracts?" A preliminary investigation
by NASA as to the cause of the probe's failure placed
suspicion on a transistor in a clock which controlled
important computer functions and was from the same lot as one
which failed on the ill-fated $67 million dollar weather
satellite earlier the same month. (Rosewicz, p. A12) This
type of problem is not unique to NASA, the reliance on
suppliers to provide quality products is pervasive throughout
the Department of Defense (DoD) as well. DoD buys more
merchandise than all the rest of the public sector of the
United States put together. More than 30,000 firms provision
DoD; of which 15,000 are prime contractors.
(Thompson, P. 727)
Jb. DoD
After spending $2.7 billion on the Navy's A- 12
program, a medium range stealth attack aircraft to replace the
aging A- 6, the contract was terminated for default on January
7, 1991. (GAO, p. 2) Six design and management reviews
valued at $1.34 billion, with no plans for future use, were
the only goods received for this expenditure. (GAO, p. 8)
Litigation with the contractors, General Dynamics
and McDonnell Douglas, is ongoing to determine their liability
for repayment of the $1.36 billion expenditure for which no
benefit was received. While there are still many unresolved
issues, this case highlights DoD's dependence on private
industry for quality products and emphasizes the importance of
accurate and timely contract/supplier monitoring.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Given the importance of supplier quality, the primary
objective of this paper is to determine how DoD can monitor
their suppliers most efficiently while achieving the highest
degree of quality. Specific objectives which support the
primary purpose include:
• Identify private industry initiatives in contract
monitoring which can be applied to Government procurement.
• Determine the criteria and techniques used by "best
practice" private industry to monitor contractors.
• Benchmark private industry supplier monitoring
organizations against that of the Defense Contract
Management Command.
• Validate manning levels for supplier monitoring based on
techniques used by the best of private industry.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question, which addresses the
objectives listed above, is: Which "best practice" industry
initiatives, in monitoring large contract suppliers, can be
applied to Government contract administration? Secondary
questions which flow from this analysis include:
• Which criteria are used to monitor supplier performance
in private industry?
• How often does private industry review suppliers for
contract conformance based on their criteria?
• Which factors are used to determine the manning level and
organization for contract monitoring in private industry?
D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
Focused on "best practice" supplier quality initiatives in
private industry, this research will give particular attention
to the process or processes used to monitor supplier
performance on large contracts. Large contracts in this
research refers to any contract with a total dollar value
exceeding $25,000.00. This statutory level within DoD
separates large and small contracts; consequently, it was used
to distinguish large and small contracts for the purpose of
this study.
From the processes used to monitor large contracts,
initiatives which appear most relevant and transferable were
selected and their applicability to Government contract
administration assessed. Because most DoD contract
administration is consolidated under the Defense Contract
Management Command (DCMC) , this activity will be used as the
primary point of comparison between Government and private
industry practice. Existing supplier quality programs within
DCMC, primarily the Process Oriented Approach to Contract
Administration Services (PROCAS) and In-plant Quality
Evaluation (IQUE) , will be analyzed in depth. Further, the
DCMC Organization structure will be reviewed and suggestions
made to strengthen the organization based on "best practices"
from private industry.
E. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Limitations
The primary limitation with this type of research is
the quantity and availability of benchmark data. This is
particularly true within private industry, as there is no
incentive for industry leaders to give information to firms
who may become their toughest competitors.
For the Government, although the threat of competition
does not exist, firms of adequate size, with similar contract
types and dollar values are very few, limiting the number of
firms which can be chosen. At the other extreme, a
limitation inherent to benchmarking is the possibility that a





An assumption made throughout this document is that
the benchmarking process for "best practice" firms accurately
selected those with the most applicability for DoD. In
benchmarking, it is critical to identify the best in the
industry and ensure that the sample selected relates directly
to the organization conducting the study.
F. SUMMARY
Chapter I demonstrated the importance of quality, and
showed the heavy reliance on suppliers to deliver quality end
products. In addition, it introduced the key focus of this
research- -comparing large contract monitoring procedures in
private industry to their DoD equivalent DCMC.
To facilitate this comparison, Chapter II will give
background information on: benchmarking, the concept of "best
practice, " Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award Criteria and
Purchasing Magazine's Medal of Professional Excellence.
Additionally, firms used to conduct this study are introduced
and an overview of DCMC given. Chapter III will then describe
how: data were collected, the benchmarking methodology applied
to this research and "best practice" firms were selected.
Chapter IV presents the data, and Chapter V analyzes
common initiatives in "best practice" firms and compares and
contrasts these initiatives with DCMC procedures. Finally,
Chapter VI concludes this study with conclusions,
recommendations to improve DCMC's contract monitoring
processes, summary answers to the research questions
identified and recommendations for further research.
II BACKGROUND
This chapter looks at specific background issues which
require clarification. It first defines benchmarking, a
concept central to this study, and then outlines how the
concept of "best practice" will be used. Tied closely to the
definition of "best practice, " as applied in this study,
selection criteria for the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality
Award and Purchasing Magazine's Medal of Professional
Excellence will be discussed.
Additionally, introduction information is given on firms
selected for research including: selection criteria,
approximate size and main line of business (i.e.
manufacturing, services, retail, etc). Similar information
about DCMC follows the list of firms selected. This background
review sets the stage for the presentation and analysis of
data received.
A. BENCHMARKING
Benchmarking is a popular process in the business sector
brought on by ever increasing competition. Companies want to
know what their competitors are doing and hope to improve
their own internal processes by adopting ideas from their
competition. Purchasing magazine describes benchmarking as
"...a systematic approach or process to drive change into
an organization. It arrives at change by doing process- to
-
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process comparisons and developing data about performance
output level for the process. In other words, it is the
search for those practices that lead to superior
performance. (Graham, p. 64)
Figure (2-1) shows the
steps in the benchmarking
process. (Graham, p. 64)




The actual methods used to
tailor this process to DoD
are outlined in Chapter III.
However, because the first
step in the process requires
selection of "best practice"
firms with which to
benchmark, information on
"best practice" and the two
• Determine what should be
benchmarked based on critical competitive
factors.
Determine Companies to benchmark
with
• Analyze processes and determine gaps
in performance - your company and
benchmark
• Establish cause of gap
• Establish best practices to close the
gap and apply with necessary modification
Figure 2-1 Process
Benchmarking Model
central evaluation criteria used to make that determination in
this research are outlined below.
B. DETERMINING "BEST PRACTICE" FIRMS
The most critical decision in any benchmark or comparative
study is determining industry leaders in the critical
competitive factors. Recent management theory places a great
11
deal of emphasis on buying and supplying quality products and
how to identify "best practice" suppliers.
(Weber & Johnson, pp. 1-19) Background information on the
two evaluation criteria used in this study to define "best
practice" - -the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award and
Purchasing Magazine's Medal of Professional Excellence- -are
discussed below.
1. Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
The Malcolm Baldrige award, named for a former
Secretary of Commerce (1981 to 1987) , was created by Public
Law 100-107 on August 20, 1987. Since then there have been 17
recipients who have demonstrated, through extensive
examination, a superior commitment to quality in seven
different examination categories. Examination categories
together with the maximum points possible for each category
are shown in Figure (2-2) . Each category shown is subdivided
into greater detail. Further, participating companies are
broken down into three categories- -manufacturing, service and
small business. Based on the examination criteria and company
category, the qualifying inspection is carried out by a team
certified by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the American Society for Quality Control
(ASQC) . (NIST)
Of these three categories only companies in the
manufacturing category were considered to benchmark with
12
DoD's contract administration organization. This list
includes; Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division,
Motorola, Xerox, Miliken & Company, IBM, Cadillac Motor Car
Company, Solectron Corp, Texas Instruments, and AT&T Network
Systems Group (Transmission Systems Business Unit) . Of these,
only Motorola was selected for this research because of their
size and the distinction of also being a recipient of
Purchasing magazine's Medal of Professional Excellence.
2. Medal of Professional Excellence
The Medal of Professional Excellence is awarded each
September by Purchasing
magazine to the single
Examination Category Points
firm which has
^ demonstrated the highest
2.0 Information & Analysis 75 degree of
3.0 Strategic Quality Planning 60 professionalism and
4.0 Human Resource 150
result-oriented
Development and Management procurement performance
5.0 Mgmt of Process Quality 140 throughout the year.
6.0 Quality and Operational 180 From 1990 through 1993
,
Results ..in sequence, these firms





Figure 2-2 Malcolm Baldrige Award Each of these firms met
Criteria
13
the criteria outlined in Chapter III, and accordingly, will be
used as "best practice" firms for the purpose of this paper.
C. INTRODUCTION OF "BEST PRACTICE" FIRMS SELECTED
Table (2-1) lists the selection criteria, approximate
size, and main line of business for each firm selected.








































Project 60, a comprehensive study of defense wide
procurement, initiated in 1962 by Secretary of Defense (Robert
McNamara) , was the seed which grew into the current Defense
Contract Management Command. Bolstered by the cost cutting
success of consolidating Air Force, Army, and Navy supply
functions into the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) in 1961,
Secretary of Defense McNamara saw the consolidation of Service
14
wide contract administration functions as a logical next step.
(Mastin, p. 14) Consequently, Secretary of Defense Project 60
was established to explore the best way to consolidate the
contract administration function.
The charter of Project 60 was to:
Propose a plan for establishing uniform field contract
management covering all contract management functions such
as quality control, review of subcontracting practices,
property administration, industrial security review, price
proposal review, etc. Provide alternate plans for
placement of contract management and organization
therefore within the Department of Defense. (DoD Project
60, P. 5)
The study itself was conducted by 84 seasoned Government
personnel separated into 13 task forces; each assigned an area
for review corresponding to their expertise. In 1963, after
a year of concentrated effort and some 337 visits to 171
various Air Force, Army, Navy, DSA, and NASA activities a four
volume report was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
(Mastin pp. 12-13) . The report included 25 recommendations,
foremost of which was the establishment of a Defense Contract
Management Agency which reported directly to the Secretary of
Defense. (DoD Project 60, P. 13)
Duplication resulting from non- uniformity between Service
branches in procedures employed for review of contractor
internal management systems such as accounting, purchasing,
and estimating was the primary justification for this
recommendation. An example used to illustrate this problem
was an identical antenna procured from the same source by the
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Army, Air Force, and Navy. The antenna was classified
unclassified by the Army, confidential by the Air Force, and
secret by the Navy with a range in price from six to twelve
dollars. (Project 60, p. 48)
Interestingly, Project 60 did not directly address the
reasoning behind separation of contract award and
administration. In fact the report said:
For the purposes of Project 60, it was determined that
contract management would be treated as a functional area
which can and should be distinguished from those functions
usually accomplished by the buying center or program
office prior to the award of a contract. The merits of
this approach used predominantly by the Air Force and the
Navy, can be debated by proponents of the alternate method
of combining the buying and contract management functions
into the same office and approaching the entire job with
the same group of people. (DoD Project 60, p. 6)
By adopting this philosophy Project 60 greatly strengthened
the argument for separating these functions and tacitly
endorsed this philosophy by recommending a separate defense
contracts administration organization.
In January 1966, only three years after Project 60
recommendations were published the Defense Contract
Administration Services (DCAS) came into existence.
Organizationally, it reported directly to DSA vice becoming a
separate organizational entity. Operationally, DCAS was
separated into 11 geographical regions with local agencies
responsible for covering the entire United States. (Mastin. P.
19)
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Today DCAS is the Defense Contract Management Command
(DCMC) a branch of the Defense Logistic Agency, formerly DSA,
and is the primary organization for the administration of DoD
contracts.
The present day organization has seen dramatic and
constant change over the past three years. In 1990 the
organization name changed from DCAS to DCMC and its contract
administration role expanded. The change was a result of the
1986 Packard Commission study which pointed out the
duplication of contract administration functions conducted by
Service plant representative offices at major weapon system
manufacturers. Based on a Packard Commission recommendation,
DCMC took over Air Force, Navy, and Army plant representative
offices and consolidated them into Defense Plant
Representative Offices (DPROs)
.
The next major change occurred this year as a result of
DCMC's new focus on teaming and customer satisfaction. Using
the teaming concept, DCMC headquarters reorganized internally
into process action teams to improve customer support.
In 1993, DCMC has over 400,000 prime contracts in house
with a face value of $800 billion. These contracts represent
over 25,000 different contractors and require a work force of




This chapter defined benchmarking and "best practice, " two
concepts which are dominant throughout this study.
Additionally, selection criteria for the Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Award and Purchasing Magazine's Medal of
Professional Excellence were discussed. Finally, "best
practice" firms were introduced along with background
information on DCMC.
Chapter III will describe how data for conducting this
research were acquired and outline how the process
benchmarking model will be applied to the data collected.
Further, background information on the concept of "best
practice" and both the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award and
Purchasing Magazine's Medal of Professional Excellence will be
used to explain the methodology for selection of "best
practice" firms selected for this study.
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Ill METHODOLOGY
The methodology chapter is made up of two sections.
Section A describes how research data were collected. Section
B details how the benchmarking and "best practice" concepts,
introduced in Chapter II, are used to interpret the data
collected.
A. DATA COLLECTION
The basic research data used in this report were acquired
in the following manner: review of current literature,
interviews with DoD and civilian personnel, and survey data.
Each of these areas is expanded below and mention made of the
most significant contributors of data.
1. Literature Review
While there is an abundance of information on quality
topics and "how to" books on benchmarking, very little data
were available on the actual purchasing operations of
companies to be reviewed. The only relevant source of written
data on purchasing organizations came from Purchasing
magazine. Its articles, particularly on Medal of Excellence
Award Winners, provided an ideal source of information for
benchmark purposes
.
Another excellent source for general reference
material was the Monterey Institute for International Studies
19
library. Through CD-ROM technology, they subscribe to a data
base titled Pro-Quest which allows users to search for key
words in brief summaries of recent journal and newspaper
articles. This data base is periodically updated and proved to
be very current and informative.
2 . Interview Data
Interviews became the primary source of data for
information within DoD. Initially, surveys were envisioned
for use both within the private sector and DoD for data
collection. However, after faxing a proposed survey copy to
DCMC headquarters, their recommendation was to solicit data
by phone and personal interview. (Toda)
Assisting in this effort, the head of DCMC's Customer
Outreach Program was most helpful in both answering research
questions and providing follow- on points of contact within
their organization. Personnel in charge of monitoring
contracts for NASA, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , and
inventory control points were contacted.
Interviews with private industry were used to
supplement information from literature review and gain
valuable insight into the overall organization. Personal
interviews were conducted with Intel and Hewlett-Packard
procurement managers and a phone interview made with the head
of procurement for Motorola's Government Electronics Group.
20
3 . Survey Data
The lack of response on surveys (Appendix A) made it
obvious that getting detailed survey information is difficult,
and led to a more aggressive search for information through
personal interviews and telephone calls. Of seven surveys
sent only one returned with a substantive response, Hewlett-
Packard. Two other firms responded by letter declining to
participate, and no response was received from the remaining
four firms surveyed.
A recommendation to future researchers is to select
topics where data are available without the use of a survey,
or if a survey cannot be avoided, structure the questions with
multiple choice type responses which minimize completion time.
To summarize, heavy emphasis was placed on existing
literature for research of "best practice" firms along with
survey and interview data. Much less written data were
acquired on DCMC placing a greater reliance on phone
interviews and a plant visit to the Defense Contract
Management Area Office for San Francisco.
B. METHODOLOGY FOR DATA ANALYSIS
Two methodologies key to this research are the application
of the process benchmarking model, and the selection process
for "best practice" firms. Each of these concepts were
introduced in Chapter II; however, description of their
specific application to this research is described below.
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1. Application of the Process Benchmarking Model
Each of the five steps of the Process Benchmarking
Model, shown in Figure (2-1), are listed below and their
specific relationship to this study defined.
a. Determination of Critical Competitive Factors
The primary critical competitive factor in this
study is the initiatives used by "best practice" private
industry to monitor large contract suppliers. Additional
critical factors which will be considered include: criteria
and monitoring techniques used by private industry, design of
their procurement organizations, and manning level criteria.
In accordance with the model, these factors are selected by
the initiator of the study based on their anticipated value to
the organization.
b. Determining Companies to Benchmark
Next to selecting the right criteria, this is the
most critical step in benchmarking. Accordingly, it is
discussed at length in a following section on selection of
"best practice" firms.
c. Analyzing Processes and Determining Gaps
The process analysis outlined in this step is the
topic of Chapter V. In brief, commonalities will be drawn
between initiatives of "best practice" firms, and then
compared and contrasted with DCMC procedures. This procedure
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will highlight DCMC initiatives which are on the leading edge
of industry practice and identify areas where gaps exist.
d. Establish Causes of the Gaps
Causes of gaps will be explained in the section of
Chapter V which contrasts DCMC with private industry.
Additionally, some causes, defined as barriers to
implementation, will be presented with recommendations for
improvement in the final chapter.
e. Establish Best Practices to Close Gaps
This final step in the benchmarking model
implements "best practice" initiatives to improve performance.
For the purpose of this study, final step requirements will be
met in the closing chapter with recommendations to improve the
DCMC monitoring system.
2. Determination of "Best Practice" Firms
A critical decision, in any benchmark or comparative
study, is determining industry leaders in the critical
competitive factors. Since this study is aimed at improving
the contracting monitoring function within DoD, the goal is to
find comparable "best practice" procurement organizations
within private industry. Because there are few, if any,
private firms which match DoD in buying power and procurement
diversity this proved difficult. Compounding this difficulty
was the need to clearly distinguish firms who resemble the
Government and are industry leaders in procurement practice.
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To assist in making these determinations,
recommendations were solicited from two firms in the
benchmarking business- -Prism Research and Gongos & Associates.
Prism Research is located in Cleveland, Ohio and Gongos and
Associates, founded in 1990, is located in Auburn Hills,
Michigan. Both firms were asked how they determined "best
practice" firms when conducting benchmark studies.
Prism Research stated that they do internal surveys
with companies in the same industry as their client company,
and use the results to rank firms in order of best overall
practice. A sample of the survey criteria included: the scope
of their service, strategic importance of the service
provided, customer satisfaction, cost, etc. (Deshpande)
Gongos Associates said they have no set strategy for
determining "best practice" firms and they conduct benchmark
studies only with companies designated by their customer.
Their feeling is customers know who their competitors are;
making a separate determination not required. (Krug)
This study applies a combination of both approaches,
by focusing on firms which are identified as "best practice"
and are large in size, analogous to what a DoD competitor
might be in private industry. As DoD has no equal in size or
direct competition, size as a criterion is used here as a best
approximation. For this research, "best practice" firms are
either a Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award winner or a recipient
of Purchasing magazine's Medal of Professional Excellence.
24
Additionally, firms selected must have annual sales in excess
of $5 billion.
C. SUMMARY
Chapter III explained the methodology used for collection
and analysis of data. Collection methodologies included:
review of current literature, interviews with DoD and civilian
personnel, and survey data. Analysis of data collected will
be done using the five steps of the process benchmarking
model. A critical factor of the model, the selection of "best
practice" firms, was based on firms which are proven
performers and comparable to DoD in scope. Proven performers
were further defined as either a Malcolm Baldrige Quality
Award winner or a recipient of Purchasing Magazine's Medal of
Professional Excellence.
Next, Chapter IV will introduce data acquired on "best
practice" firms and DCMC.
25
IV DATA PRESENTATION
Data collected on general contract management trends,
the supplier monitoring process, and the procurement
organizations within each "best practice" firm selected in
Chapter II are presented below. For the ease of the reader,
and facilitation of the benchmarking process, the same
information with regard to DCMC is presented in the final
section of this chapter.
A. PRIVATE INDUSTRY DATA
The data for each of the firms described below will be
presented in the same basic format. The purpose is to give
the reader a sense of comparison between companies and set the
stage for the analysis in Chapter V which will draw
commonalities between approaches of different firms.
Interestingly, whether dictated by the market place, achieved
independently, or through their own benchmarking initiatives,
the supplier management strategies of these companies have a
great deal in common. In order the firms reviewed here will
include Ford, Motorola, Hewlett Packard, and Intel.
1. Ford Motor Company
Ford Motor Company has taken an aggressive stance on
quality which is paying off in improved market share and
better profits. Since 1980 the quality of their product,
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measured by reported defects, has improved 70% making them the
leader of the Big Three. (Raia, 1990, p. 41) Quality does pay,
of the top ten selling vehicles in the United States for 1993
eight are domestic and five of these are Fords. (Zino, p. 8)
a. Contract Management Trends
With a 1990 purchasing budget of $50 billion,
Ford is keenly aware of the role suppliers play in the quality
of products. The following is a paraphrased list of contract
management initiatives which Ford has instituted to compete in
today's market. (Raia, 1990, pp. 41-42)
• Globalization of supply base. In 1990 $15 billion of
Ford's annual budget was spent on overseas sources. With
a global market, finding the right technology and price
means looking at all possible sources.
• Optimization of supply base. Since 19 80, Ford has
aggressively trimmed its supplier base. From 1984 to 1990
maintenance, repair, operating suppliers were reduced from
7,000 to 3,000. Ford's "Ql" program has been the key to
this initiative.
• Long-Term contracts. Over 70% of Ford's suppliers are
under three to five year contracts.
• Single- sourcing. A highly controversial approach, Ford
has moved aggressively in this direction. Most of their
production parts are purchased from a single source under
a long term contract.
• Early supplier involvement. Starting with the Ford Taurus
in the 1980' s, heavy emphasis has been placed on team
design work with suppliers. Today an estimated 70% of
Ford's total procurement budget goes to suppliers involved
with concurrent engineering. Concurrent engineering
refers to suppliers who assist in engineering parts while
the end product is still being developed at Ford.
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Jb. Supplier monitoring Process
In addition to the initiatives above, Ford has
three separate quality programs aimed at improving the quality
of suppliers: Ql, Total Quality Excellence (TQE) , and Supplier
Quality Improvement (SQI) . Established in August 1981, with
advice from Dr. Deming, the Ql program became the tool by
which Ford culled out non-performers from its supplier base.
Today, a supplier of production parts must be Ql certified to
do any business with Ford. This certification is extended to
a specific manufacturing location which forces each plant of
a major supplier to stand on its own merit.
A follow- on program to Ql, TQE was initiated in
1987 to assess all levels of a suppliers operations from
engineering ability to delivery and commercial performance.
Unlike Ql, the TQE award is given on a commodity basis vice a
particular plant. To qualify suppliers must be Ql certified
and be able to document continuous process improvement and
present an assessment of their core business areas; product
quality, engineering, delivery, and commercial viability.
This self assessment is then analyzed by the Ford buyer
assigned to that commodity and compared with Ford's internal
assessment of the supplier. If the supplier scores above 90%
in each of the four areas they are eligible for the TQE award.
By the end of 1990 seven suppliers had fully qualified under
this standard. (Raia, 1990, pp. 52-53)
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Recognizing that many suppliers did not have
the in house capability to improve their processes, Ford took
a tip from Mazda (25% owned by Ford) and established a
technical assistance branch within their buying activity
called Supplier Quality Improvement (SQI) in 1987. The SQI
team consists of over 100 technical specialists whose primary
responsibility is to assist suppliers in early product design
and quality improvements. (Raia, 1990, p. 52)
c. Procurement Organization
Ford has a highly centralized purchasing
organization broken down into three areas of operation: North
American Automotive Operations (NAAO) which manages production
purchasing for all North American body and assembly plants,
Diversified Products Operations which handles purchasing for
a wide array of automotive and non- automotive businesses, and
International Operations which handles all of Ford's overseas
procurement. Key points to note in this organization are its
emphasis on economy of scale buys and division of labor by
commodity within each area of operation.
2 . Motorola
Finding itself surrounded by Japanese competition
for market share, Motorola saw the need for quality earlier
than many of its fellow U.S. companies. In 1981 they began a
drive to improve quality by tenfold, then by a hundredfold,
and finally developed a six sigma quality goal which has
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become a trademark. In simplest terms, six sigma means no
more than 6.8 defects per million component parts.
Their hard work and innovative approach to quality-
has paid off dramatically. Motorola has expanded its sales
outside the U.S. to 44% of its total revenue vice 25% in 1985.
(Raia, 1991, p. 1)
Throughout the improvement process, Motorola is
certain that aggressive contract management has been
invaluable. Their unique approach to contract management is
outlined below.
a. Contract Management Initiatives
The following are paraphrased initiatives from
Purchasing magazine on how they achieved their success.
(Raia, 1991, pp. 38-41)
• Willingness to learn best -in- class practices. To quote
management "We are born benchmarkers .
"
• Sharing their innovative techniques with suppliers through
technical assistance and education offered at their own
university. (Motorola University)
• Setting the same aggressive goals for suppliers as they
impose on themselves
.
• Developing a consistent approach among decentralized
business units with regard to assessment of supplier
performance.
• Instilling what they call a Quality System Review (QSR)
guideline with suppliers which enables suppliers to do
self assessment on their product and performance.
• Centralizing market research data gathered throughout the
various branches of the organization to act as a central
reference point.
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• Reducing the supplier base through supplier monitoring and
weeding out suppliers who fail to show continuous
improvement. The supplier base has dropped from an
estimated 4,200 in 1985 to 1,155 in 1991.
• Insuring early supplier involvement with emerging projects
by letting suppliers actually participate in the design of
new components.
b. Supplier Monitoring Process
Critical to the success of the initiatives
listed above is the close monitoring of suppliers for
conformance to the rigid quality standard Motorola requires.
To accomplish this, Motorola implemented a system aimed at
determining the total or true cost of a product. Titled
economic index, they devised a mathematical system based;
50% on quality (measured in defects in parts per million) , 30%
on late delivery, and 20% on early shipments. The goal of
the index was to calculate the cost to Motorola of suppliers
who failed to conform with contract requirements. The best
score a supplier can receive is 1.0; this means that the
actual contract price was the true cost to Motorola. In other
words, no additional costs were incurred as a result of
suppliers who violated one of the index criteria.
Suppliers who achieve a score lower than a
steadily decreasing annual cut-off are eligible for supplier
awards and follow- on business. Failure to lower scores over
time is used as a tool to weed- out suppliers who do not show
improvement. (Raia, 1991, p. 44)
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Another key facet of Motorola's supplier
management is their emphasis on training and working with
suppliers. Their corporate philosophy embraces close working
relationships with suppliers and a mentor -protege approach to
their development. To achieve this goal they have set up a
university for training and a Quality System Review (QSR)
program.
Motorola University, founded in the late 1970s,
was originally designed to improve the skills of only Motorola
employees. Realizing the need for similar training for their
suppliers and the inability of many smaller companies to
internally sponsor such training programs, Motorola offered
courses to suppliers at reduced rates. The communications
sector, within Motorola, found this training so effective that
they require all of their suppliers to attend courses in the
following areas: design for manufacturing, design for




The QSR program is defined as an audit which
looks at "...the collective plans, activities, and events that
are provided to ensure that products, processes, and services
will satisfy customer needs." (Raia, 1991, p. 47) Like their
University, when QSR(s) were initiated in 1981 their purpose
was to improve only internal quality. In 1989; however,
Motorola began using the same plan to assess the quality of
their suppliers. By 1991 they completed audits on
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approximately 500 suppliers. Key suppliers can now expect an
audit every other year and are required to submit a corrective
action plan for areas which fail to qualify.
c. Procurement Organization
Motorola is a highly decentralized
organization, comprised of business units called sectors, and
groups which operate as business units within sectors.
Consequently, each group has its own design, engineering,
manufacturing, and purchasing staff.
The purchasing department at Motorola's
Automotive and Industrial Electronics Group in Seguin, Texas,
a typical purchasing department organization, consists of six
commodity teams. Each team is responsible for the procurement
and quality evaluation of suppliers within their general
commodity area. As a purchasing department, the Seguin team
introduced a "dock to stock" program which eliminated over 70%
of incoming supplier inspection. This reduction was achieved
through certifying suppliers, and then relying on the
effectiveness of their internal quality controls to preclude
costly reinspection of material upon receipt. (Raia, 1991, p.
45)
A corporate buying department was established
in the early 1980' s, at the corporate level, to capitalize on
economies of scale. Staunchly resisted at first, the
significant savings passed along to participating groups,
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quickly reversed this view. A prime example were the millions
saved when Motorola centralized capacitor procurement, a $460
million annual purchase. Part of these savings came from
reducing the supplier base for capacitors, through the quality
process, from an industry wide 108 to only three corporate
suppliers. (Raia, 1991, p. 43)
Mr. Larry Burleson the head of Motorola's
Government Electronics Group, approximately 60 buyers with a
$200 million annual outlay, in Scotsdale Arizona, gave some
additional insight into their purchasing operation. He was
asked to explain: whether contract award functions were
separated from management functions, how efficiency was
measured among buyers, what quality measurements were used to
assess supplier performance and the relative importance to his
organization of noncompetitive follow- on awards, long-term
contract relations and global sourcing for suppliers.
Motorola does not separate the contract award
function from contract management. Even though a good
percentage of their contracts are centrally procured, the
actual contract award takes place only after a meeting of the
concerned groups who agree on award criteria. Subsequent to
award, it becomes the responsibility of the procurement
commodity managers within the concerned groups to monitor the
contract for performance and complete administrative
functions. Essentially this allows the group level commodity
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teams complete control of the contract from award through
final payment.
This concept of complete control followed
nicely with what Mr. Burleson described as direct -line
management. The term direct -line management refers to a
commodity buying teams direct responsibility for the
procurement needs of an entire product or production line.
He explained that his buyer teams are as small as two or large
as ten depending on commodity, and include both design and
quality engineers. The teams focus on the process and are
concerned with every aspect of product development
.
In assessing the efficiency of individual
buyers Mr. Burleson stressed that individual appraisals at
least in part are tied to the effectiveness of the team. He
added that each buyer does have separate goals and objectives
tailored to the individual but stressed that these objectives
were more qualitative than quantitative.
Statistical sampling of incoming material was
stressed in evaluating supplier performance. Mr. Burleson
related that of the 1200 suppliers he deals with, down from
over 3 000, each receives a monthly report card showing initial
inspection rejects, production line reject rates and any
customer returns where their product was defective. This type
of monitoring provides the data necessary to calculate six
sigma quality described earlier. On the topic of suppliers,
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Mr Burleson went on to say that of the 1200 suppliers 95% of
their business is with 300 or less.
The importance of awarding follow- on contracts
based on past performance was stressed as a critical advantage
when evaluating the relative importance of noncompetitive
awards, long-term contracts and global sourcing. Mr. Burleson
sees early supplier involvement in the design phase as a
critical part of their companies success. He went on to say
that suppliers who commit themselves to assisting in the
development stage of an end product do so with the knowledge
that they will receive the follow- on work. Long-term
contracts were viewed as a natural vehicle for maintaining
close working relationships with suppliers and facilitating
early involvement in product design.
Mr. Burleson pointed out that this is
s 'gnif icantly different from Government contracting for major
weapon systems where the initial design, prototype
engineering, and manufacturing are bid competitively and often
done by different companies. He went on to say that while
the dollar amount of the actual contracts awarded in each of
these phases may be lower the separation of these functions
leads to costly transition problems which drive up the total
cost.
On the issue of global sourcing, his feeling
was that in the current day global economy it is almost
impossible to discern the country of origin of a given
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product. He explained this view by saying the raw materials
for a product may come from Japan the processing work done in
the United States and the major corporate stockholders are
from Taiwan. This type of fragmented control makes the
concept of buy American obsolete.
Because of his close relationship with DCMC as
a primary Government source of supply, Mr. Burleson gave some
final comments on what he sees as areas where the organization
needs improvement. Foremost of these was the feeling that
Government contracting representatives, both in initial
procurement and administration, are inundated with
regulations. He related that Government representatives are
overly concerned with making procedural mistakes and
constantly documenting their decisions to satisfy outside
auditors, like the Inspector General. He added that the
focus on competing every contract has prevented the Government
from taking advantage of long-term relationships critical to
overall effectiveness.
In closing, he pointed out that Government weapon
systems research and development funding no longer drives the
cutting edge of technology. He added that the Government must
find ways to use emerging commercial technology in their
programs if they want to maintain a technological edge. This
is in opposition to the existing approach where suppliers
build custom parts to Government specifications.
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3. Hewlett-Packard
Hewlett-Packard (HP) has enjoyed tremendous success
in carving out a niche in the computer and computer peripheral
market . While other computer related companies have
experienced a slump, HP continues to enjoy high profit margins
and dominates the market in ink and laser jet printers. When
asked of the importance of procurement in carrying out this
success, HP's CEO, Mr John Young, had this to say:
Material cost reduction is very near the top of HP's list
of 'must' objectives. Every aspect of procuring materials
must be managed expertly and can be achieved only after
serious and demanding negotiations with our suppliers.
Our procurement people are embarking on these negotiations
with the unwavering objective of providing HP with the
best supplier performance in the industry. (Raia, 1992, p.
32)
Linked with supplier performance is HP's emphasis on
quality. HP saw a 10 -fold improvement in product quality
during the 1980s primarily from improved supplier management.
To better understand the mechanics of their approach to
suppliers, this section will again look at the contract
management initiatives, supplier monitoring process, and the
procurement organization within HP.
a. Contract Management Initiatives
A 1992 article in Purchasing magazine, which
awarded Hewlett-Packard the Medal of Professional Excellence,
listed six key reasons for their purchasing success. The
following is an abridged version of each: (Raia, 1992, pp.
32-36)
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• Top management support for strategic planning in attaining
purchasing goals.
• Centralizing buying power in a highly decentralized
organization
.
• Development of close strategic alliances with suppliers of
leading- edge technology.
• Global sourcing of desired goods. To quote one corporate
procurement executive "If you're not able to buy from all
over the world, you do not have an effective purchasing
department .
"
• Quality. During the 1980 's an estimated 10- fold
improvement in quality was achieved.
• Strategic sourcing through the following activities:
development of a written strategy, gaining division
involvement and consensus, firm fair supplier
negotiations, ensuring contracts contain the results of
negotiations, ensuring contract compliance.
b. Supplier monitoring Process
Not surprisingly, Hewlett-Packard has a
specially designed software package, titled procurement
management information system (PROMIS) , for handling all the
facets of purchasing (Figure
• Maintain procurement specification data
and related supplier information.
4-1) . This system forms a
vital link between highly
• Update purchase contract activity and diversified divisional
changes from sourcing plan.
procurement shops and the
corporate purchasing
department . The goal is to
• Electronically transmits orders and
forecasts to suppliers. present a consolidated front
• Maintain supplier performance
information.
to suppliers. Divisions can
Figure 4-1 PROMIS Functions negotiate with confidence if
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they know the weight of corporate contracting is on their
side. To further enhance this policy, corporate procurement
conducts a quarterly procurement strategy board (PSB) where
the best minds in the business exchange ideas on how to
improve the process. A critical part of the PSB process is an
assessment made of key suppliers in the areas of: technology,
quality, responsiveness, delivery, and cost. Listed in order
of importance, this assessment is referred to as simply TQRDC
by HP procurement staff. Once this assessment has been made,
strategies for future procurement plans are made, by
commodity, with TQRDC qualified suppliers. (Raia, 1992, p. 37)
c. Procurement Organization
HP is highly decentralized, like many major
manufacturing entities since the late 80' s. It has plants in
25 different U.S. cities and 16 foreign countries. As
mentioned earlier, the benefits of centralized procurement are
not lost just because the company is decentralized. In fact,
the corporate procurement branch takes the initiative in major
commodity buys and sets the strategy for divisions to follow.
Accordingly, their work force requirements are determined by
contract complexity and dollar size.
An interview with Mr David Jansen, the director
for subassemblies procurement at corporate headquarters, gave
additional insight into the HP procurement organization. To
40
find out how the organization really works he was asked: how
buyer efficiency was measured, whether or not HP separates
contract administration from award, and if any major corporate
changes were ahead. In addition, he was asked to weigh the
relative importance of: non- competitive follow- on awards to
proven performers, long-term contracts and global sourcing of
requirements.
Buyer efficiency within HP is measured between nine
commodity buying groups using two separate metrics. The first
is a traditional metric- -worth 60% of the overall evaluation-
-
and includes such items as judgment, quality, team-work,
employee development, etc. The second metric places each
commodity group in direct competition. Each commodity group
tracks a predetermined index for their commodity (i.e.
semiconductors, monitors, power supplies, plastic resins,
interconnects, etc.). This index is then compared to their
own negotiated purchase price for the commodity. HP sees the
index as the price their competition is paying and expects to
do better. Commodity groups are ranked annually by how much
they beat the index. Based on this ranking group members are
moved up or down on a five tier ranking structure for pay and
promotion. This injection of competition among commodity
groups is credited with improving HP's overall buyer
performance.
HP handles the financial end of procurement at the
corporate level and lets the divisions take care of the
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physical side. Corporate puts the contracts in place, but it
is up to the divisions to monitor performance and make buys
against the corporate contract. This separation fits well
with their highly decentralized corporate structure.
In the future HP sees an increase in corporate
procured commodities. Mr. Gene Richter, the head of corporate
procurement, formerly from Ford, believes strongly in
centralized procurement. Accordingly, more commodities will
be screened through the divisional levels to determine whether
they can be centrally procured effectively. Test and
measurement equipment is the next commodity under
consideration.
Follow- on noncompetitive awards are used only if the
price is right. Even in commodities like computer memory- -HP
has nine percent of the world market- -quality has become so
standard that awards are increasingly made on price alone. HP
has 12 suppliers of computer memory, and feels that the number
of suppliers is dependent on the number needed to supply the
product. There is no conscientious effort to reduce the
number of suppliers. In fact, many suppliers do not want
total dependency on one customer and will not take business
above a specified percentage.
Long-term contracts are used only when they benefit
HP. If the commodity is experiencing a seller's market, then
an effort will be made to close a favorable long-term
contract. If the commodity is experiencing a buyers market
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long-term contracts are avoided to ensure maximum advantage of
competition and declining prices.
Global sourcing is the most critical element to HP's
procurement success . Mr Jansen said that in computer memory
Korea is "Saving our Bacon. " He is actively pursuing
suppliers in China as well and sees tremendous potential for
both future suppliers and sales. (Jansen)
4. Intel
Intel's success story shows the dynamic nature of
the high technology industry. Listed 10th in the chip making
industry in 19 87, by 1992, Intel surpassed both NEC and
Motorola to become the number one chip maker in the world.
(Raia, 1993, p. 73) With the introduction of Intel's 486
micro processor chip, sales in 1992 jumped 22% and profit was
up over 30% topping $1 billion for the first time. A critical
factor to their success has been placing purchasing on equal
footing with design and manufacturing. The following
initiatives, supplier monitoring processes, and organization
are what makes the Intel procurement operation one of the best
in the business.
a. Contract Management Initiatives
These initiatives won the Purchasing magazine
Medal of Excellence Award for Intel. (Raia, 1993, pp. 70-71)
• Intel's supplier support program allows suppliers to use
Intel equipment in Intel manufacturing plants to better
learn the trade.
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• Their unique approach to contract pricing has built in
price increases when suppliers exceed predetermined goals
in output and quality.
• Through consolidation Intel has reduced their supplier
base and now relies on only 20 suppliers for over 80% of
their contracting needs.
• Teamwork across functional lines and specialization by
commodity allows faster turnaround times and more informed
decisions
.
• Development of a strategic purchasing plan which includes
long-range sourcing strategies for all major commodities.
• Top management recognition of the procurement function as
co-equal with design and manufacturing.
• Support of local business through nurturing programs aimed
at reducing dependence on foreign sources.
• Paperless ordering. For example, their Albuquerque plant
estimates that 95% of their supplier communications are
paperless
b. Supplier monitoring Process
Intel's approach to supplier monitoring is a
combination of process validation and quality control through
close association. Originally, contract performance was
measured by defects per lot with upper and lower acceptability
limits for defective parts. Realizing that this approach
inherently accepts variations from the mean, they changed
their policy to require perfect parts every time. This new
goal embraces continuous process improvement and provides
incentive for suppliers to improve. Intel is committed to long
term relationships with key suppliers and prefers to validate
their process, obviating the need for internal inspection.
However, if a supplier is suspected of a process problem,
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Intel demands a root cause analysis within 24 hours. (Raia,
1993, p. 81)
Intel's top supplier award is the Supplier
Continuous Process Improvement Award. Like the Malcolm
Baldrige Quality Award it is based on 1,000 possible points of
which suppliers must score 700 or more to be eligible for the
award. To date only one supplier, Sumitomo, one of three
silicon suppliers, has achieved this award.
Mentioned earlier, Intel is committed to long
term close working relationships with suppliers. In
conjunction with this goal they have developed a strategy
titled N+l. What this means is they want enough suppliers to
provide the total quantity of a commodity and one extra to
provide for growth and cushion against unexpected shortages
.
A key problem with this plan is finding
suppliers with the needed capabilities to provide this target
base. To overcome this problem Intel has developed a supplier
support program (SSP) to build up their supplier base. The
plan allows suppliers to work with Intel equipment at Intel
manufacturing plants until they have acquired the expertise to
produce on their own. Through this close association, Intel
evaluates suppliers based on- -technical capability, quality
and reliability, ability to expand services to other plants,
total cost, and the desire to build and sustain a long term
relationship.
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Recognizing their dependence on Japanese
producers for many raw materials- -particularly plastic
casings for semiconductor chips, photo steppers used to
imprint circuit patterns on silicon wafers, and ceramic
packages- - Intel has used their SSP program to promote domestic
suppliers. Last year, for the first time in eight years, 51%
of their equipment needs were met within the United States.
c. Procurement Organization
Intel organizes its procurement shop by
commodity and centralizes almost all of its procurement at
their procurement headquarters in Chandler, Arizona. In
addition to the procurement of key component materials, the
Chandler operation handles advertising, plant construction,
capital equipment, and transportation.
With the introduction of the new Pentium chip,
up to five times faster than the 486 version, Intel sees a
continuation of their rapid growth and an ever expanding
procurement budget. Topping the $1 billion mark for the first
time in 1987, the Vice President of procurement anticipates
that expenditures will exceed $3.8 billion in 1993.
Mr. Sean Dowd, a purchasing manager for Intel's
Corporate Marketing Group was interviewed to better
understand the mechanics of their procurement organization.
Questions asked included: how buyer efficiency was measured,
what the overall satisfaction level of the buyers was, whether
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or not Intel separates contract administration from award and
if any major corporate changes were ahead. In addition, he
was asked to weigh the relative importance of: non- competitive
follow- on awards to proven performers, long-term contracts and
global sourcing of requirements.
Buyer efficiency is measured through an annual
development plan worked out between the buyer and immediate
superior. This plan is tailored to the individual buyer and
addresses areas for improvement, actions to be taken for
improvement and how success will be measured in each area.
For example, if negotiation skills is an area of deficiency
the action taken may be attending a class in negotiation,
success can then be measured either by class standing or an
actual assessment of there skill in subsequent negotiation.
Satisfaction level of Intel procurement personnel is
high. Mr. Dowd supported this position by sighting low
turnover rates in personnel, increasing work opportunities and
a general perception that the role of procurement is
increasingly seen as of equal importance with engineering,
manufacturing and marketing the more traditional functional
areas within the corporation. In fact, he related that his
purpose for being at the Santa Clara headquarters was to take
over the management of contracting for advertising from the
marketing department. This function had ballooned to over
$2 00 million in business and was the only major corporate
47
level expenditure not already under the supervision of
corporate procurement
.
Intel like HP allows divisions to handle most
contract administration functions. Corporate procurement
relies on the divisions to inform them of quality problems and
handle the physical inspecting and use of new products. This
does not mean that corporate washes their hands of
responsibility for quality products. The quality of goods
received under the corporate umbrella is a direct reflection
of the expertise of the commodity buyer. Accordingly,
corporate purchasing managers are sensitive to divisional
needs and always striving for continuous product improvement.
A recent initiative in this area is a company wide supplier
monitoring program which is still in the development stage.
The ultimate goal is to- allow input from all divisions
concerned on a suppliers level of quality measured in terms of
on- time delivery, flexibility of supplier to meet emergent
demands, product defects, etc. This system would allow
corporate purchasing managers real time access to supplier
performance data when assessing follow- on contracts or
incentive bonuses.
Other new procurement initiatives currently underway at
Intel include small purchase order charge cards and supply-
line management. The goal of the charge card system is to
reduce paperwork by letting responsible representatives within
the corporation to procure. operating supplies on an as needed
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basis without going through procurement. This concept offers
greater flexibility to the line manager and empowers them to
handle day to day purchasing needs. Supply- line management is
a term Intel uses for contracting out an entire process to a
single source of supply. For example, the chemicals and
processing equipment used in "clean room" fabrication sites
are now purchased from a single source where previously two
suppliers were used. Now if a site does not meet the
stringent cleanliness requirements for manufacturing
semiconductors there is only one responsible party.
Previously when contamination occurred equipment manufactures
would blame the chemical manufacturers and the reverse
.
Mr. Dowd believes that follow- on contracts with the
same contractor are critical to Intel's success. He preferred
not to use the word non- competitive and stressed these
contracts were in fact very competitive; he dispelled the fear
that this type of arrangement may lead to complacency by
saying a contract is only as good as how it is managed. This
philosophy on follow- on contracts held equally true for long-
term contract arrangements with suppliers. All things equal
Intel's preference is to buy American, but global competition




For consistency, presentation of data on DCMC will be
presented in the same general categories as private industry.
1. Contract Management Initiatives
The following is a list of initiatives which were
extrapolated from interviews and literature review.
• The supplier monitoring function is centralized within
DCMC. Previous NAVPRO, ARPRO, and AFPRO plant
representatives were consolidated in 1990 to DPRO's.
• Heavy emphasis is placed on monitoring supplier processes
with the introduction of In- Plant Quality Evaluation
(IQUE) and process oriented contract administration
services (PROCAS)
.
• The organization is making significant reductions in size
which include reducing their U.S. districts from five to
three
.
• Upper management has reorganized into process action teams
and focused more on customer needs.
2. Supplier Monitoring Processes
Supplier monitoring within DCMC is governed by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and is highly dependent
on the size of the supplier and the individual contract. The
size of a supplier in terms of total contract dollars with the
Government triggers various forms of monitoring functions
which are carried out by the three major divisions within
DCMC, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) . These
divisions include contract management, quality assurance, and
program and technical support. To better understand this
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process an overview of supplier monitoring requirements within
each division is given below.
a. Contracts Management Division
The contracts management division has overall
responsibility for all contract monitoring. Organizing
required supplier monitoring- -a complex task- -is the
responsibility of administrative contracting officers (ACOs)
.
The ACO is a warranted contracting officer who has a specific
number of suppliers assigned to his or her responsibility for
an entire range of administrative functions. Monitoring is
only one part of sixty six administration functions outlined
for ACOs in FAR part 42.302(a) . A common approach to this task
is the preparation of concise lists of oversight requirements
for each company under an ACO's purview. Table 4-1 is a
current example of such a list for a major electronics
company. This list is a duplication of one provided by an ACO
working at Defense Contract Management Area Office, San
Francisco. Specific FAR references and Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) references were
added to show the regulatory basis for each monitoring
activity.
The key points of interest in this list
include: the range of responsible parties conducting oversight
studies (shown in parenthesis under the system reviewed) , the
number of studies required, and the FAR mandate. The FAR does
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allow some room for interpretation in the area of follow- on
supplier monitoring and the need for additional oversight.
However, the fear of regulatory oversight compels most ACOs to
interpret FAR requirements in their strictest sense.
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TABLE 4-1 SYSTEM REVIEWS REQUIRED BY FAR
N
R
System Review Status Interval Ref














(DCMAO-SF Prop Mgmt Br.)
DCMO South Bay As Required FAR 45.511
4 Quality Assurance
(DCMAO-SF/GFBQ)



















8 Material Mgmt & Acctg









9 Master Subcontract Plan
(DCMAO-SF Small Bus.)
MOA by ACO Annual FAR 44.304
Note 1: Requirements number (1, 2, 7, and 9) are for companies with
anticipated annual Government sales over $10 million.
Note 2: Requirement (3) gives the ACO authority to audit control systems
for Government furnished property- -if provided on contract- -on an as
required basis.
Note 3: For requirement (4), the Government relies on the contractor to
perform quality inspection and testing. However, DCMC Quality Assurance
Representatives periodically validate these procedures and handle unique
quality specifications as required by contract.
Note 4: Requirement (5) is designed for contracts which are cost-type,
fixed-price redeterminable, or fixed price with progress payments.
Note 5: An estimating system and MMAS review, requirements number (6 and
8) , are required for contractors with greater than $50 million in DoD
business the preceding year.
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Because of the ACO's unique position as the
overall coordinator for all administration functions, they are
often the lightning rod for new DCMC initiatives. Process
Oriented Contract Administrative Services (PROCAS) is the most
recent initiative embraced by DCMC headquarters.
Through the steps outlined in Figure 4-2,
PROCAS tries to form a partnership with suppliers. (Stacy-
Nichols, p. 9) It is interesting to note how this system
closely parallels private industry supplier assistance
programs like; Ford's supplier quality improvement program,
Motorola's University and Intel's supplier support program.
Both PROCAS and private industry initiatives stress early
supplier involvement and offer assistance to suppliers in
understanding how their internal processes can be improved.
DCMC representatives are now a part of a firm's
day to day operations planning team. Previously, there was
little emphasis placed on
assisting suppliers in the
1. Government planning




5. Understanding the process approach has received high
6. Select appropriate metrics
7. Measure, analyze, manage praise in some business
8. Adjust management
circles
Figure 4-2 PROCAS Steps
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In a recent article, the American Society for
Quality Control outlined the PROCAS process as it has been
applied at General Electric, and had this to say about
results:
In addition to improving speed and quality, the PROCAS
approach provides a way to target limited resources where
they will do the most good. Both GE and DCMC want to make
sure that top- quality engines are produced on time, to the
customer's specifications.... (ASQC, p. 6)
While PROCAS has many positive points,
discussion with ACOs responsible for implementation pointed
out two negative aspects. First, it does not reduce oversight
but rather streamlines supplier systems to better produce
oversight requirements. Secondly, the program requires
additional manning; consequently, only select firms are
participating in the program. Not surprisingly, these firms
are the Government's largest suppliers, already familiar with
the monitoring system. As a result, many smaller suppliers
who are unfamiliar with the process and would benefit greatly
are left out of the PROCAS program.
It is important to note that this program is not
singular to the contracts management division. It is presented
here because it requires overall coordination between DCMC
branches, a function which normally falls to the ACO.
(1) Quality Assurance Division
The quality assurance division has
recently seen some significant changes. In May 1990, DLA
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implemented In- Plant Quality Evaluation (IQUE) as a new system
to take the place of the Contractor Quality Assurance Program
(CQAP) . The new IQUE system, outlined in DLAM 8200.5, is
aimed at replacing the rigid strict conformance to
specification requirements of the previous system with a
process and customer- oriented approach. Mandatory end item
inspections are replaced with process or product audits. New
tools such as, statistical process control, Pareto analysis,
flow charting and control charts are emphasized where they
were not previously.
The IQUE approach focuses on: guidelines
vice rigid rules, less control of practices vice tightly
controlled rules, establishing a range of quality tools vice
specific rules, and encouraging flexibility vice contractual
remedies. Accordingly, the role of the quality assurance
representative (QAR) has changed from that of a policeman to
more of a coach. This new change has been dramatic for many
QARs, and has required a great deal of training to change the
existing culture. (Alstott, pp. 6-10)
In addition to IQUE, many QAR's are called
on by the DoD customers they serve to provide specific types
of quality audits. The branch head of the quality department
at DCMAO San Francisco related that his work is driven by
specific test and inspection criteria designed by NASA, his
primary customer. Because of the high risk nature of the
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aerospace industry, his inspection requirements usually
include a 100% review of the end items.
(2) Program and Technical Support Division
The program and technical support
division, made up of engineers and industrial specialists,
looks at specific contract requirements and assesses a
suppliers ability to conform with performance, cost, and
schedule requirements.
For major weapons systems contracts (R&D
expenditures over $200 million or total expenditures over $1
billion in 1980 constant dollars) which make up the bulk of
Government procurement dollars; cost, schedule, and
performance ability are the key components to monitor. To
understand how this division works, Figure 4-3 shows a current
list of functions generated by an Engineering Process Action
Team at DCMAO San Francisco. (Gines)
For each
item listed in this figure
there is a flow chart and
instructions for
implementation. Discussion of
all of these procedures is
beyond the scope of this
paper; however, to gain








Technical Support to Negotiation
Tech Data
System Safety Surveillance
Value Eng Change Proposals
Figure 4-3 Planning & Technical
Support Functions
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procedures an overview of the reliability and maintainability
program, and C/SCSC are given below. These two programs were
selected as they are generic to most major contracts and are
representative of other program structures.
The key to the reliability and
maintainability program is the reliability plan generated by
the supplier in response to a Government request for proposal.
This reliability plan outlines the internal control procedures
which the supplier has in place to monitor the quality of its
product for compliance with contract specifications, and is
usually approved prior to contract award. Government
engineers then audit the company for compliance with their own
plan. Figure 4-4 is a flow diagram of how this audit function
is done at DCMAO San Francisco.
The diagram shows that if an approved
control plan is not in place at contract award, DCMC is
deeply involved with the contractor to set up such a plan.
Additionally, DCMC is constantly monitoring the supplier for
compliance. The next section describes C/SCSC, a required
part of every major weapon system acquisition designed to
closely monitor cost and schedule performance.
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REVIEW LETTER OF DELEGATION AND
MEMORANDUM OP AGREEMENT
I
REVIEW STATEMENT OF WORK AND DETAILED
SPECIFICATIONS
IDENTIFY ALL TAILORED MIL STDS REQUIREMENTS
VERIFICATION OF NEW PLAN
. VISIT ALL R/M ACTIVITY SITES.
• MONITOR FOR PROGRESS ON
WRITTEN POLICIES/PROCEDURES.
• REVIEW COMPLETED POLICIES/
PROCEDURE AGAINST SOW OR
DETAILED SPECIFICATIONS.
• ESTABLISH AND COORDINATE
COMPLIANCE METRIC WITH
CONTRACTOR.
COMPLIANCE • EXISTING PLAN
REQUIREMENTS
REVIEW SURVEILLANCE METRICS.
REVIEW R/M ANALYSIS IN THE CDRLS
SAMPLE METHOD WHERE APPLICABLE
REVIEW CONTRACTOR'S FAILURE
INVESTIGATION REPORTS.
• WITNESS OTHER R/M ACTIVITIES
SUCH AS LIFE/RADIATION I ESTINO.
MAINTAIN ABILITY DEMONSTRATION.
DISCUSS R/M ANALYSIS FINDINGS
WITH CONTRACTOR'S R/M ENOR.
REQUEST REVIEWOF R/M SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS IF REQUIRED.










REPORT NON APPROVAL OF
CONTRACTORS R/M PLAN TO
PI/SPI/ACO A BUYING OFC
• REVIEW WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S
NON-COMPLIANT POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES.
• COORDINATE A CORRECTIVE
ACTION FLAN A BCD
I
• REPORT NON-COMPLIANCE TO
PI/SPI/ACO A BUYING OFC
FUNCTIONAL AREA
I
• SCHEDULE NEXT SURVEILLANCE
AND ACTION ttQ* FQ4XQW4JP
Figure 4-4 Reliability/Maintainability (R/M) Surveillance
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Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria
(C/SCSC) , designed for major weapon systems acquisition, is
the primary tool used to monitor supplier cost and schedule
performance. In essence, this system looks at cost and
schedule performance by converting all contractor activities
into a dollar value and using that dollar value as a yardstick
against actual performance.
To better understand this process, one
must first discuss the work breakdown structure required for
every major weapon system acquisition. This structure breaks
the construction of a new system down into its lowest
component parts, work packages. Each work package is a
detailed instruction on how to perform some task which when
combined with other work packages make up the entire system.
Further, work packages give a detailed accounting of the
estimated labor and material cost to complete the entire
program.
These work packages then become the link
between the work breakdown structure and the C/SCSC process.
Once they are established, DCMC audits a specific number of
packages for completion and compares the actual cost reported
by the contractor against the scheduled cost to estimate
whether the complete project will be over or under budget.
Additionally, the budgeted cost of work performed is compared
with the budgeted cost of work scheduled, for a given point in
time, to determine if the program is on schedule.
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Contractors have their internal C/SCSC
estimating system reviewed for compliance upon contact award.
The review covers the areas of: organization of work, planning
and budgeting, accounting, revisions and access data, and
analysis of variances. Within these broad categories there
are 35 specific criteria which are used to gauge the
effectiveness of the supplier's data generating system.
The accuracy of the contractor's internal
reporting system is crucial. The data retrieved from this
system is then used in the following reports; Contract Funds
Status Report, Cost Performance Report, Cost/Schedule Status
report, and Contractor Cost Data Reporting. These reports
provide updates to the program sponsors which include; the
major systems command, DoD, and Congress.
3 . DCMC Organization
DCMC is a branch of the Defense Logistics Agency and
is organized by geographical districts. Within each district,
depending on the number and size of contracts, suppliers are
monitored by either a defense contract management area office,
or a defense plant representative office. Appendix B shows
how DCMC is organized under DLA, Appendix C shows the current
district organization of DCMC, and Appendix D shows the
organization within DCMAO San Francisco.
Mentioned earlier, a Base Realignment and Closure
Recommendation was made to realign the districts from five to
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three and efforts to do so are ongoing. This will expand the
areas covered by the remaining districts and result in
increased workloads for ACOs
.
Currently ACOs receive work assignments based on zip
codes. While allowances are made for the size and dollar
value of companies, new business within a specific zip code
already has an ACO assigned. One ACO at DCMAO San Francisco,
was responsible for 300 contractors with $3.2 billion total
value
.
In connection with work assignment, funding passed
from the district to the DCMAO is based on workload in terms
of the number of contracts and dollar value. However,
conversation with personnel at the San Francisco area office
suggested that the budget was primarily static and related
that budget cuts between districts are mandated on an across-
the-board percentage basis suggesting that workload is not a
predominant budget criteria.
C. SUMMARY
Chapter IV presented contract management initiatives,
supplier monitoring processes, and the organization structure
of contract monitoring activities both within private industry
and DCMC. Chapter V will analyze key industry initiatives and
identify commonalities between "best practice" firms. These
common initiatives will then be compared and contrasted with
DCMC procedures. This is analogous to step three in the
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benchmarking process model, presented on page 11, which
requires determination of performance gaps between the company
conducting the study and the "best practice" firm being
studied. Additionally, explanations for differences between
private industry and Government will be presented which will
support recommendations in chapter VI for improving the
process.
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V. ANALYSIS OF "BEST PRACTICE" INITIATIVES
This chapter will look at initiatives which are common to
the "best practice" firms identified by this study, and then
compare and contrast these initiatives with current DCMC
processes. The goal is to discover gaps between approaches
which can be eliminated through adoption of private industry
practice. This analysis parallels steps three and four in the
benchmark process which looks first at determining gaps or
differences and then analyzes the possible causes.
A. COMMON "BEST PRACTICE" INITIATIVES
The initiatives listed below are common to all "best
practice" firms. Each is deemed critical to the success of
the procurement operation and contract monitoring procedures
of the firms studied.
1. Early Supplier Involvement
Companies are looking for innovative ideas and
assistance from suppliers to reduce cycle times and improve
product quality. Early supplier involvement, enhanced by a
reduced supplier base and long-term supplier relationships,
allows buyer and seller to work as a team capitalizing on the
best skills of each organization to promote new products.
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2. Centralized Procurement of Key Products
The spectrum of centralization ranged from Ford at the
high end, where 80% of spare parts are purchased centrally
(through their North American Automotive purchasing group) , to
Hewlett-Packard at the low end where only 10% of line items
are procured centrally. Interestingly, the 10% of line items
procured centrally accounted for 50% of Hewlett-Packard's
annual outlay. (Raia, 1992, p. 37) The commonality here is
that all "best practice" firms aggressively took advantage of
quantity buying power even if they were highly decentralized.
3. Supplier Monitoring & Recognition
All of the top private industry firms had a unique
program for monitoring and recognizing supplier performance.
Programs which emphasized quality in terms of technology,
number of defects, level of technology, etc. over cost. These
programs served as a performance measuring stick and a tool to
weed out noncompetitive suppliers, another common initiative.
4. Reduced Supplier Base
With the exception of Hewlett-Packard, every "best
practice" firm made significant reductions in the number of
their suppliers over the past several years. From 1980 to
1990, Ford trimmed its supplier base by 40%. (Raia, 1990, p.
42) The prevailing thought was a reduced supplier base
enhanced visibility and offered advantages through better
service and closer working relationships.
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Quality programs were critical in achieving supplier
reductions. In every case, supplier down sizing decisions
were made based on the suppliers quality rating.
5. Global Sourcing
In each company there is increased procurement from
foreign countries. Of $50 billion in annual procurement, Ford
spent $15 billion in foreign procurement in 1990. (Raia, 1990,
p. 49) Intel and Motorola are totally dependent on foreign
sources for certain key components in their computer chip
manufacturing. In fact, they are so concerned about the
domestic supplier base that they have each established
initiatives to improve the base: Motorola through its
university for training quality, and Intel with its supplier
support program. They both feel that the lack of quality
domestic suppliers leaves them overly exposed in the event
foreign suppliers opt to restrict their exports.
6 . Long Term Contractor Relationships
In conjunction with reducing their supplier base and
early supplier involvement, "best practice" companies are
establishing longer term relations with remaining suppliers.
Along with these longer term relations is the demand for
constant improvement. Many of Ford's long term contracts
include clauses which reduce prices each year of the contract
life based on anticipated improvements in productivity.
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B. COMPARISONS WITH DCMC ORGANIZATION
Of the six key trends identified, early supplier
involvement, centralized procurement, and to a lesser degree
supplier monitoring & recognition are evident in both DCMC and
private industry. A closer look at these parallels is seen
below.
1. Early Supplier Involvement
Realizing the importance of working with suppliers,
DCMC's most recent initiatives- - IQUE and PROCAS--rely on heavy
involvement with a supplier's process. These programs give
all divisions within DCMC greater awareness of a supplier's
process and valuable points of contact within the supplier
organization. This critical element in the contractor-
supplier relationship allows quicker and more thought out
changes with input from both the end user and manufacturer.
Additionally, new contract awards are now closely integrated
with the supplier as a result of an improved knowledge of his
internal processes.
2. Centralized Procurement
DoD has long been a proponent of centralized
procurement. Through its Defense Logistic Agency inventory
control points, all DoD spare part requirements are procured
centrally.
This concept is not limited to spare parts; increased
emphasis is also being placed on the interoperability of
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weapons systems between services through centrally procured
system components. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology, Dr. John Deutch, underscored this
goal by outlining a plan to rely on a common pool of
equipment, from expensive radars and navigational systems to
ground- based simulators, for both Navy and Air Force aviation
requirements. (Pastor, p. A12)
Like private industry, the goal of this initiative is
two- fold; first, to reduce cost through interoperability and
spare part support; second, to recognize economies of scale by
pooling asset requirements.
Centralized procurement impacts DCMC by reducing the
number of suppliers to monitor. This reduces administrative
cost and gives DCMC larger contracts on which they can focus
greater resources.
One of the advantages of centralized procurement in
the private sector not realized by DCMC is the advantage of
coupling large centralized buys with long term supplier
relationships. This concept is discussed in greater detail in
Section C.3, but is mentioned here as there is a natural
connection between centralized procurement and long term
supplier relationships.
3. Supplier Monitoring & Recognition
Through PROCAS and IQUE, DCMC has two excellent
vehicles for monitoring contractor performance. Like private
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industry, DCMC is actively working with contractors to improve
their internal quality control processes. This teaming
approach increases contractor efficiency and improves the end
product. William Waldmen, a senior TRW official identified
37 specific improvements since adopting PROCAS including a 50%
decrease in cycle time for Government forward pricing rate
agreements and a 49% decrease in rejections.
(Stacy-Nichols p. 8)
Unfortunately, unlike private industry these DCMC
initiatives fall well short of their full potential. A
discussion of areas where this system needs improvement is
given in Section C.5.
C. GAPS BETWEEN DCMC AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY
DCMC initiatives which are not common or do not closely
parallel private industry include: reduced supplier base,
global sourcing, long term contractor relationships, formal
organization which includes both a contract award and
administration function, and to some extent, supplier
monitoring and recognition. Each of these differences is
discussed further below.
1. Reduced Supplier Base
As a result of the statutory limitations imposed by
the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) and the emphasis
placed on competition throughout every phase of major system
acquisition, the Government has historically been extremely
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competition- oriented and aggressively expanded their supplier
base. This is in direct contrast with private industry which
has actively decreased their number of suppliers in the past
decade
.
Recently this dichotomy in approaches has come under
a great deal of scrutiny. Fueled by reduced DoD spending and
President Clinton's "Bottoms-Up Review" carried out by the
Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, the Government is becoming
increasingly active in assisting suppliers to convert their
facilities for commercial use and allowing reductions in the
number of Government suppliers. Mergers previously considered
by the Federal Trade Commission as antitrust violations, like
Alliant Techsystems and 01 in Corp, are now being reconsidered.
Both firms are in the ordinance business, which due to a
decline in Army missile procurement, attempted a merger in
1992 which was aggressively opposed by the Federal Trade
Commission. (Ricks, p. A16)
While this renewed Government interest appears to be
a step in the right direction, there is no sign of eliminating
the CICA mandate for fair and open competition on all new
procurement
.
2 . Global Sourcing
Buying U.S. made products has been a fundamental
concept of Government acquisition from its inception. The
Government has used Federal acquisition as an instrument of
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its fiscal policy in every major depression and recession.
Currently, the Government still sees the creation of jobs
through federal spending as a primary vehicle for reducing
unemployment
.
Legislation like the Buy American Act (BAA) inhibits
DoD from aggressive global sourcing. The inability to procure
globally protects segments of the defense industry base from
global competition. This forces both the PCO and ACO to deal
with contractors who may be inferior to foreign competitors
both in quality and price.
3. Long-Term Contractor Relationships
Long-term relationships which are key to improved
supplier relations in industry require federal approval within
DoD and are seldom used. While shorter contracts may be more
flexible in an environment of constant change, the benefits of
longer term relationships cannot be overemphasized. A long
term relationship not only fosters a partnership between buyer
and supplier, but it allows contractors a greater degree of
planning in terms of facilities, capital requirements, and
work force.
Additionally, frequently changing companies forces a
completely new set of monitoring requirements on DCMC which
then must start from ground level and workup to understand the
new companies' procedures. (Kennedy) While there are
certainly cases which require a supplier change, the cost of
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doing so is recognized within private industry, but often
ignored in the DoD sector.
The politics of maintaining close Congressional
control is most frequently cited as the impediment to enacting
multi-year contracts. The power of the purse, undoubtedly
Congress' strongest source of power, would be diminished if
DoD were given authority to commit funds on a multi-year
basis. Accordingly, Congress has micromanaged spending within
DoD through the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and
Appropriations Committees.
4. Organization Structure
Private industry evaluates contracts with feedback
directly from the end user, the companies production line.
Systems like Hewlett Packard's PROMIS system (Chapter II 3.b)
are designed to handle contracts from cradle to grave with
direct input access from all concerned parties. This
contrasts with DoD's structure where contract award is
performed within a Service- specif ic organization (e.g. Air
Force, Army, Navy, Marines) and monitoring is done by DCMC a
DoD wide organization, not an end user.
This separation of the PCO and ACO functions can lead
to inefficiency. For example, an ACO at DCMAO San Francisco
recalls conducting a pre- award survey (a thorough assessment
of a company's financial viability prior to contract award),
on a contractor which had a long history of successful
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Government performance because a new PCO was unaware of its
past performance. He added that there is no common database
between organizations which tracks supplier performance.
(Pfeiffer) This lack of a common database between
organizations ensures, at a minimum, duplication of effort
when contract information is entered from one database to
another. This is compounded by the fact that DCMC services
all procurement branches of DoD: each have their own unique
automated procurement systems.
Communication between PCOs and ACOs has been a topic
of some debate. A study of this topic in the arena of major
weapons system acquisition recommended:
PCOs and ACOs assigned to weapon system contracts continue
to strive for more effective and more complete
communication in order to eliminate voids and minimize
duplication of effort in performing contract
administration. (Wanner p. 44)
Because the unique separation between PCO and ACO
functions, under the current DoD organization, does not
closely parallel private industry, it is presented here as a
possible area for change.
5. Supplier Monitoring and Recognition
Discussed here are reasons why supplier monitoring and
recognition within DCMC fails to meet its full potential.
Reasons for this failure include the following: (1) failure to
reward superior performers, (2) no centralized database for
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supplier monitoring (3) excessive oversight requirements.
Each of these areas are discussed further below.
a. Failure to Reward Suppliers
The best reward a superior supplier can hope for
within the Government system is improved profit on an existing
contract. Even that may not be possible depending on the
contract type. Private industry offers tangible incentives in
the form of long term and incentive -based contracts. Ford
estimated that over 70% of its suppliers are under long term
contracts. (Raia, 1990, p. 42) Intel said of incentive-based
contracts: "the concept has inspired our U.S. suppliers."
(Raia, 1993, p. 73)
Of these two contract types, long term contracts is
the most tangible as it offers a base on which companies can
plan for future workload and long term viability. Government
contractors do use incentive contracts, but regulation
requires Congressional approval of contracts which obligate
money longer than one fiscal year. (DoD 5000. 2M p. 21-1)
Jb. Jziadeguate Feedback
Because the procurement contracting officer (PCO)
and the ACO work for different commands there is often a
costly disconnect. Mentioned earlier there is no central
database which documents supplier quality within DCMC. As a
result, the best data available on a suppliers past
performance is a periodically updated and distributed list of
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suspended or debarred contractors. This is significantly
different from private industry where the procurement
contracting officer has either a centralized database for
supplier performance or holds periodic performance reviews on
each supplier with the product end user.
c. Excessive Oversight
The list of oversight requirements for Government
contracts is endless. To gauge the scope of the problem look
at the agencies authorized to perform oversight; DCMC, PCO and
staff, program/project manager, Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) , Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Agency
Inspector General (including; Defense Criminal Investigate
Service, Navy Investigative Service, U.S. Army Criminal
Investigation Division, and Air Force Office of Special
Investigations) , General Accounting Office, and various
Congressional committees and staff. (Sherman p. 71)
With this number of auditing bodies, there is
little wonder why many businesses shy away from Government
contracts. The bureaucracy inherent in this type of oversight
is staggering. Recently the Under Secretary of Defense, Dr.
William Perry, addressing Naval Postgraduate School at a guest
lecture, stated that 3 0% of every Government procurement
dollar goes to administration vice 10% in private industry.
This thought was echoed by ACOs at DCMAO San Francisco, who
were quick to point out that many of the monitoring reports
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which they receive are done to satisfy FAR mandates and have
little value added.
D. SUMMARY
Chapter V identified six common initiatives in contract
monitoring within private industry; early supplier
involvement, centralized procurement, supplier monitoring and
recognition, reduced supplier base, global sourcing, and long
term supplier relationships. Of these initiatives the first
three were apparent within DCMC to varying degrees, but the
last three were not. Based on the analysis of these
differences, Chapter VI will draw some conclusions, make
recommendations to improve the DCMC organization, give summary
answers to the initial research questions and list areas for
further research.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The final step in the benchmark process, this last chapter
will draw conclusions on why differences exist between private
industry and Government contract monitoring and make
recommendations on improving DCMC's contract monitoring
procedure. Additionally, a section will be devoted to
summarizing answers to each of the research questions
presented in Chapter I and identifying areas for follow- on
research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Two conclusions drawn from this research which must be
addressed are: (1) private industry has no organizations
equivalent to DCMC, and (2) Government contract monitoring
will never closely parallel private industry without a change
in goals.
1. DCMC Has no Private Industry Equivalent
Private industry has no organization like DCMC which is
solely responsible for the administration of contracts.
Consequently, many of the comparisons made with private
industry, and recommendations for improvement, go beyond the
scope of just contract monitoring.
This difference in organization is a central issue to
this research and became a vocal point for discussion. The
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pros and cons of separating contract award and administration
were discussed with several contracting professionals both
within private industry and Government.
Procurement mangers from both Intel and Hewlett Packard
felt that some separation was needed between the business end
of awarding corporate contracts and their administration.
They based their opinion on the difference in skills required
to award a contract and take care of the physical receipt and
material management of the product. Negotiation skills and
business acumen are key to contract award, but statistical
sa. pling and material management experience are more critical
to administration. At Motorola, group procurement managers
actually take part in corporate contract awards.
Consequently, they maintain control of both contract award and
administration. (Burleson)
On the Government side the separation of contract award
and administration is more complicated. Because DCMC is not
the end user of the product, like private industry groups,
the contract administrator (DCMC) is accountable to the
procuring organization who in turn works for the end user.
This separation from end users can cause mistakes. The
Director of Contract Management for the Naval Sea Systems
Command stated that he has seen several examples where parts
from contracts administered by DCMC simply do not work in the
fleet. (Hickman)
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To parallel private industry, DCMC would need to
combine with the Service procurement organizations and allow
the end users to perform the physical side of contract
administration. Taken alone, this step would put contract
administration back to where it was before the 1963 Project 60
study; the study which led to the merger of Army, Air Force,
and Navy contract administration organizations and gave birth
to the current DCMC organization.
An alternative to this approach, would be the merger of
DCMC with a new DoD-wide procurement organization responsible
for all Army, Air Force, and Navy procurement. The resulting
organization would encompass the entire contracting process
from award through administration and close-out.
At least in part this type of organization has been
proposed before. Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, both
former Secretaries of Defense, made a similar recommendation
to the New York Times in 1988, saying:
We should also consider integrating the acquisition
system, creating a single organization staffed by
civilians and military officers from each service. A
radical change like this, however, should be
developed, evaluated and- -assuming it holds up to
scrutiny- -implemented by the Defense Department
itself. The imposition of such an organization
through legislation would guarantee failure. (Dobler,
Burt, Lee, p. 705)
The profound nature of this recommendation prompted some
additional inquiry into its feasibility.
The Director of Contract Management for the Naval Sea
Systems Command said that such an organization was possible,
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but added that an assessment of its merit would be extremely-
difficult. (Hickman) The Deputy Director for Contracts at
Fleet Industrial Service Center (FISC) Oakland said he was
surprised that there were no existing initiatives to
centralize contracting across Service lines. He added that
regional consolidation of large contracts was ongoing within
the Navy in response to base closures and down sizing. At
FISC Oakland, the current plan is to withdraw large contract
authority and refer any large contract requirements to the
Naval Regional Contracting Center in San Diego. On the issue
of combining procuring and administration functions, he felt
separation was necessary and stated that the emphasis placed
on contract award among Procuring Contract Officers causes
administration to fall through the cracks if not handled
separately. (Copas)
The Head of Contracting for Public Works Center (PWC)
Oakland felt that the degree of specialized knowledge required
for different types of contracting made consolidation across
service lines infeasible. He added that the $65 million in
large contracts for which PWC was responsible were managed
from cradle to grave in house. Repair and overhaul, ground
maintenance, and hazardous waste disposal made up the bulk of
the PWC workload and required specialized knowledge to award
and administer. Further, he felt that DCMC's role was geared
towards administration of supply parts type contracts and not
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particularly suited for major weapon systems or construction
type contracts. (Haitz)
Posing the idea of a single DoD organization to the
Program Manager for Customer Outreach at DCMC, he pointed out
that such a proposal had been discussed before, but felt it
was unwarranted. He added that since the transition from DCAS
to DCMC in 1990 the organization has been increasingly in
demand by PCOs. Further, with the advent of fee for service
he felt certain the role of DCMC would expand outside the
boundary of DoD and perform contract administration for other
Government agencies. He noted that such an expansion would
compound the difficulty of creating a single DoD contracting
organization. (Toda)
Summarizing these various views it is clear that a
great deal of ambivalence exists towards a combined DoD
procurement organization. The concept of such an organization
is addressed here only because the current DCMC structure is
not present in the best of private industry. Consequently,
revising the existing structure is an area which merits
further consideration, but is beyond the scope of this
research.
2. Public VS. Private Industry Contracting Goals
One contract professional stated that two thirds of
the purpose for Government contract administration is to
ensure compliance with congressional socio-economic programs.
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(Hickman) These programs like small business set -asides, set-
asides for minority and disadvantaged businesses, promotion of
Federal Prison Industries, conformance with fair labor laws,
and promotion of environmentally sound products hampers the
systems ability to match private industry efficiency. (Sherman
pp. 346-353) In contrast, the primary goal of private industry
is best value in terms of quality, delivery schedule,
technology, and price.
This fundamental difference in goals between
Government and private industry makes comparisons difficult.
The issue of changing goals and corresponding legislation is
unavoidable if Government contract monitoring will ever truly
parallel private industry.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Prior to presentation of recommendations, it is important
to note that the area of Government acquisition reform has
received a great deal of scrutiny with limited success in
effecting reforms. A 1988 Congressional report subsequent to
the Packard Commission findings noted that it was the sixth
major study of defense acquisition in the past four decades,
recognizing the fact that it was merely addressing continuing
problems. The forward of the report quoted the current House
Armed Service Committee Chairman (Les Aspin) saying: "Perhaps
the next executive commission should be created, not to
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propose the reforms, but to implement them." (U.S. Congress,
1988)
A common thread throughout previous commission reports and
the most recent Section 800 Panel and National Performance
Review (promulgated in 1993) was the need to reduce Government
oversight and allow managers greater flexibility to act more
like private industry. A quote from this year's National
Performance Review highlighted this need by saying we need to
"...change federal -procurement from 'rigid' rules to 'guiding
principles' that allow Government managers more freedom. . . . "
.
(Birnbaum p. Al)
Accordingly, the recommendations listed below call for
changes in existing policy which cannot occur without
corresponding changes in Government goals and legislation.
Recommendations include: (1) reducing DoD's supplier base
through monitoring and rewarding, (2) removing the restriction
on long term supplier relationships, (3) promoting global
sourcing of requirements, and (4) refocusing DoD procurement
on customer quality.
1. Supplier Base Reduction by Monitoring and Rewarding
Just like private industry, DCMC must act as the
catalyst for reducing suppliers and rewarding superior defense
contractors. PROCAS and IQUE are initial steps in a broader
program which must recognize superior suppliers through the
non- competitive award of follow- on contracts. This procedure
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will seriously reduce contract award costs and the number of
defense contractors.
The 1993 National Performance Review recognized the
advantage of rewarding suppliers and recommended
establishment of an inter?"^^y Excellence in Vendor
Performance Council to:
Establish policies and tec'f nies to measure contractor
performance under contracts .d use this information in
source selection. 'Federal Contracts Report, 1993)
This type of arrangement, common in privr~ industry, is
illegal under current law. The Competition in contracting Act
(CICA) , Public law 98-369, mandates competitive contract award
with only limited exceptions.
In addition to prohibiting the reward of superior
performers, this mandate negatively impacts early supplier
involvement and long term relationships. Companies who cannot
be guaranteed follow- on work are hesitant to invest in early
research and design of new products.
2. Long Term Supplier Relationships
Title 10 U.S.C. 23 06, which mandates contract types,
must b changed to allow multiple year contract awards. This
recommendation ties closely to reducing the number of
Government suppliers. Entering into longer term contractor
relations is a natural vehicle for reducing the number of
suppliers and awarding superior performance.
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The time is ripe for change. A proposal from this
year's National Performance Review called for implementation
of a two year budget. Hopefully, this initiative is a first
step in broader changes which will free the contracting
officer to award long term contracts.
3 . Global Sourcing
Government has never embraced global sourcing of DoD
acquisitions. However, with the significant initiatives to
reduce tariffs and increase trade, like GATT and NAFTA, the
Buy American Act needs revision to allow all non- critical
items to be procured globally. This will open competition to
new areas of Government acquisition and presumably have the
same effect on quality as Japanese competition has had on the
Big Three auto makers
.
4. Refocusing on Customer Quality
Government procurement personnel have been inundated
with mandated requirements for so long they are unable to
provide the kind of quality customers expect. In procurement,
quality is getting the right material, in the right quantity,
at the right time, from the right supplier, at the right price
to meet the customer's need. The current environment places
so much emphasis on oversight that contracting professionals
are unable to meet all of the quality requirements.
By reducing mandatory regulations the contracting
officer can regain the flexibility needed to meet the
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customers needs. Surprisingly, a study done by the Merit
Protection Standards Board on the quality of the contracting
work force (specifically GS- 1102s) and the quality of the
procurement process, found in general that the work force was
doing a good job. However, the procurement process was
resoundingly criticized in this same study as inefficient and
failing to serve the best interest of either the Government or
Private Industry. (Crum, pp. 161-163)
5. Summary
The Government supplier monitoring process will never
be a mirror image of its private industry counterparts unless
the underlying goals are changed. National objectives,
security needs, funding limitations and lack of profit as a
motivator are a few of the reasons for this dichotomy.
However, the general feeling that the Government is
inefficient and the continued deficit in resources demands
that every attempt must be made to adopt industry initiatives
where savings can be made.
Consequently, the recommendations of this research are
aimed at improving the contract monitoring process in the
broadest sense by freeing contracting personnel from
regulations which prohibit their efficiency.
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C. SUMMARY ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Summarized below are answers to the questions posed at the
start of this research. Additionally, the final section of
this report outlines areas of interest for follow- on research.
1. What "best practice" industry initiatives in
monitoring large contract suppliers can be applied to
Government contract administration?
Industry initiatives applicable to Government
acquisition include: (1) reduced DoD supplier base through
monitoring and rewarding quality firms, (2) use of long term
supplier relationships, (3) global sourcing of suppliers, (4)
radical reduction in oversight and (5) focus on customer and
product quality vice procurement process.
2 . What criteria are used to monitor supplier performance
in private industry?
Each private industry firm presented had unique
monitoring criteria. However, the overall trend was a focus
on "best value" described as the lowest number of defects in
parts received, responsiveness, technical innovation, just -in-
time delivery, etc.
3 . How often does private industry review suppliers for
contract conformance based on their criteria?
The goal of all firms was to reduce the level of
supplier monitoring as much as possible. However, quality
assessments were done periodically to rate overall supplier
effectiveness. For example, Hewlett Packard related that it
87
reviews supplier performance through Procurement Strategy-
Boards which meet two to four times annually. (Survey data)
4 . What factors are used to determine the manning level
and organization for contract monitoring in private
industry?
Manning levels were determined by cost and complexity
of the contracts managed. There was no specific metric found
for this calculation and procurement organizations were
treated as discretionary cost centers for budgeting purposes.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The areas listed below were identified for further
research.
• Review the feasibility of merging acquisition agencies
across service boundaries. This research would identify
various offices, develop criteria for the merger, express
how the new organization would look, and address the
barriers to achieving such a goal.
• Assess the compatibility of the different databases used
within DoD to both procure and administer contracts. This
study would outline each system, discuss compatibility
between systems, identify the amount of data currently
transferred between the procuring and administering
systems, and assess the best system for use throughout
DoD.
• Explore reengineering the internal relationship between
the major divisions within DCMC; contract management,
quality assurance and program and technical support. This
study would look at radical new ways of internal design
within the existing organization to dramatically improve
their internal processes. The study would apply
reengineering concepts outlined in Reengineering the






1. How many active contracts does your company have which
equal or exceed $25,000 in total dollar value?
2. What is the total dollar value of these contracts?
3. How many different suppliers do these contracts
represent?
4. Of these contracts how many have a duration longer than
2 years?
Note: The term contracts used in the remainder of this
survey refers to active contracts which equal or exceed
$25,000. This distinction is made for comparison purposes
with the Department of Defense where $25,000 is the
statutory separation between large contracts, which require
greater administration, and small contracts.
Supplier Evaluation
1. What are the top five criteria used by your company to
monitor the quality of supplier performance on contracts?
(i.e. timely performance, evidence of statistical control,







2. For the criteria listed in question one, what mechanisms
are in place to monitor compliance (i.e. statistical process
control, in plant evaluations, personnel assigned to
supplier plants, etc.). Providing existing documentation of
these mechanisms would be ideal
.
3. In general, how often do you review supplier performance
on contracts?
Contract Administration Organization
1. How is your contract management organization configured?
(An organization diagram and job descriptions would be most
helpful)
2. How large is your supplier monitoring work force?
90
3. How is your supplier monitoring work force structured
(by commodity, contract size, etc)
?
4 . How do you determine the size of your contract
monitoring work force (ratio of personnel to active
contracts, dollar amount of contracts, percentage of sales,
etc) ?
Supplier Monitoring Initiatives
1. What initiatives has your company taken in the past five
years to monitor and improve supplier quality? Providing
documentation of existing programs would be very helpful.
2. Are there any other initiatives you have implemented
which affect supplier performance (i.e. supplier recognition
programs, supplier training programs, etc)? If yes, please
describe the program and provide documentation.
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3 . This survey is aimed at benchmarking contract monitoring
and contract management organizations in private industry
for application to Government contracting. Based on your
experience, what initiatives do you feel the Government
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